The Dog Log 3

Loki had his third visit to the vet yesterday.  More on that below, but let me first catch you up on the past week or so.  

The last major event in Loki's medical care was his ear cleaning.  We were able to super-sedate him to the point that he allowed (with some resistence) a liquid to be poured into his ear canals.  We then wiped up the accumulated wax and debris with a cotton ball.  Having completed that task, we decided to stop torturing him until we could get him to the vet nine days later.  She would apply a "longer lasting" treatment for his ear infection.  

In the mean time he showed a few unusual behaviors.  He twice refused to climb into our car.  The first time was when we were taking him home from his Saturday obedience training.  Eventually, I had to pick him up and put him in the back seat.  I thought he would struggle during the process, but he didn't.  He was completely compliant.  A few days later we wanted to drive him to a local park so that he had some good experiences following a car ride, but again, he refused to get in the car.  We abandoned the effort.  There are only so many stressful things one should do to anyone, and Loki was having more than his share.

One night, Loki decided to sleep downstairs.  Normally, he sleeps in our bedroom; however, an hour after the lights went out, we were awakend by his very loud, agressive barking.  Loki very, very seldom barks, so something quite unique set him off.  He might have been awakened by someone dumping recycling in a bin outside our open kitchen window.  He might have awakend simply to an unfamiliar place or he might have been having a bad dream.  He barked in the middle of the night once before, shortly after he came to live with us, and I have seen him barking softly in his sleep.  So any of the three explanations for his barking fit are plausible.  Hopefully, whatever sets him off will no longer be an issue as he settles in with us.

Anyway, on to the big news: Loki had his third visit to the vet yesterday.  The whole process started with us beginning his sedation at 1:00.  We gave him 1,800 mg of gabapentin and 300 mg of trazodone.  At first, he refused to swallow them, spitting them out from the "pill pockets" in which we hid them.  Later he swallowed them eagerly when we smeared them with a pepperoni flavored cream.  Two hours later we dosed him with 0.7 ml of dexmedetomidine which we applied to his gums.  He was more compliant with this than he had been when we cleaned his ears nine days earlier.  Once that was done, it was time to drive him to the vet.

When we took him to the car, he was barely able to stand.  That he could was critical as otherwise I wouldn't be able to lift him from the floor.  He's a pretty big dog.  But I did manage to load him into the car.  Once inside the vet's clinic, it was as if he had been given a general anasthetic.  He posed no resistence to anything done to him.  The vet applied the "longer lasting" medication into his ears and took his sedated state as an opportunity to draw blood for further tests and to trim his nails.  Throughout all the procedures, he didn't flinch.  Finally, the vet gave him a medication designed to help him recover from the dexmedetomidine.  We managed to get him into a position that allowed me to pick him up and carry him to the car.  It was 5:30.  He had been with the vet since 4:00.

Once home, it was a bit of a struggle to unload him out of the car, but we managed.  He was finally, safely home.  We were extremely pleased that we were able to pull all this off and get so much done for him, but as the evening wore on, he showed no signs of recovery.  We began to worry.  He was able to raise his head around 10:00 PM when we could feed him, but that was about it for any sign of voluntary movement.  We went bed at 11:00 with him inert on the floor downstairs, but at midnight, I heard him come into our bedroom.  It was a reassuring sign that all would be well.  

The next day, he was still pretty lethargic on his morning walk, but perked up just fine by afternoon.  His hotspot is healed, so we've taken his collar cone off which means he's now able to "investigate" more of our unit than before.  We'll need to monitor him as he might try to get into things he shouldn't.  Of coure, we are putting the cone back on over night when we can't watch him, but he hasn't shown any signs of wanting to scratch or bite at his skin enough to worry about.

Having dealt with his most pressing medical issue, the vet has now pointed out that he has some inflamed spots on his elbows.  They need to be treated with the same topical antibiotic that we used on his hotspot.  The inflamed elbows aren't severe problems.  I expect they'll clear up quickly.   

All in all, Loki is doing fine.  He's even become playful at times, though he remains pretty skittish on his walks. 

The Dog Log 2

On July 16th, Loki got his first visit to a local vet.  It went surprisingly well, probably because she gave him lots of treats through the early stages of the exam.  We were particularly interested in the progess of his hotspot which was deemed to be still enflamed.  The vet was able to clear away the remains of the scab on his hotspot without him objecting much.  That was a big surprise.  Since it's still enflamed, he'll need to stay in his collar cone for about a week or so.  Becky continues to treat it, but with some procedures she hadn't been doing previously.  

He also has an infection in both ears.  That will take some daily treatment which dogs generally don't like.  If he doesn't tolerate it, we might need to use a less effective, but "long lasting," medication.  His conditions led the vet to declare that he is indeed allergic to something.  It could be environmental or it could be ticks or fleas.  The ear infection suggests an environmental allergy.  His hotspot and that ticks were found on him in the Solano County shelter would implacte ticks.  She said that food allergies are rare. He also has gingivitis.  

During the visit, Loki spontaneously volunteered a stool sample which we're having examined to learn more about his condition.  We were pleased to learn that because his current dose of seditive is quite mild, we shouldn't expect significantly new behaviors when he comes off them.  All in all, there might be a good deal of daily care we'll need to give him for the time being to overcome these conditions.  We were glad to have a thorough exam done, and we look forward to getting him in good, healthy shape.  

The vet gave us the task of cleaning his ears and administering an ointment to clear up the ear infection.  Unfortunately, Loki strongly objected to the ear cleaning, even as he had 1,200mg of sedative in him.  Per the vet's instruction, we took him back to the vet to have them try to clean his ears.  They too were unsuccessful.  Today, however, we succeeded after upping the dose of sedative to 18,000mg and adding two more additional sedatives.  He was pretty much a rag doll when we administered the ear cleaner, objecting a bit at first, but allowing us to get the job done.  He was completely compliant when we administered the ear infection ointment.  We're very happy to have got that done.  We'll have to clean his ears periodically from now on, so hopefully we'll get him to tolerate it without the sedatives.  His hotspot continues to show progress healing, but he still needs his collar cone.  

He's also gaining some confidence being near other dogs.  Yesterday, we took him to his first day of obedience school where he was around ten other dogs.  He was quit apprehensive at first, but eventually calmed down a bit.  The trainer believes he'll do fine in the class.  We have "homework" for him to do before his second training session next week.  It amounts to a few simple behaviors: getting his attention, sitting, lying down, controlled walking, and recognizing his name.  We'll start his homework tomorrow after he has recovered from today's sedatives.  

Right now he's sleeping quite soundly, and we understand it's best to let a sleeping dog lie.  I'm hoping he's having a good dream.

The Dog Log

On July 8, Becky and I adopted a dog: Loki.  He has a sketchy history and probably some neuroses.  So I thought I'd make a record of how he adjusts to his new home.  Here's a little background on him.  

The Sonoma County police found him on April 16th abandoned in a crate without water along Highway 680, between the towns of Benicia and Cordelia.   Loki was estimated to be 5 years old.  At 55 pounds, he was very underweight and his fur was extremely matted.  Clearly, he had been badly treated or at least badly neglected.  He was taken to the Solano County animal shelter.  While there, he underwent a umbilical hernia operation.  He was neutered and vaccinated.  At one point, large ticks were found dropping from his coat.  Beyond his recent traumatic experiences, there's no telling just how hard his life was before being abandoned. 

On June 6th, Loki was rescued by CalPaws, a dog rescue group that looks out for German Shepherds in particular.  Loki is by no means a pure bread shepherd, but he's enough shepherd that CalPaws found him a foster home in Sacramento.  He had reached an adequate weight of 67 pounds.

When we first visited Loki on June 29th, he had healed from his surgeries, but a "hotspot" had reappeared on his rump, something that was an issue earlier during his care at the shelter.  It was about the size of a quarter -- not so serious as to change our decision to adopt him, but a few days later it expanded to at least 3 inches in diameter.  Apparently, he aggravated it overnight.  A vet in Sacramento put him on antibiotics, an anti-inflamatory, and a sedative to keep him healthy and comfortable.  The spot was now a more serious problem, but still not enough to change our minds about adopting him; so we brought him home.

We've had him in a recovery collar cone for over a week now to keep him from further aggravating the hotspot, and thankfully, it's healing nicely.  He continues to get twice daily doses of his meds which we feed him by hand, powderized and wrapped in treats at each meal.  I expect he'll be healed soon.  

He was extremely anxious during his first day with us.  He paced about our condominium unit.  On walks, he was cautious, if not frightened of every dog or human he saw.  Happily, he has calmed down and is more comfortable on walks; however today he actively opposed going for a walk.  He backed away from the open door and bit at the leash, trying to pull it from me.  When I got on my hands and knees to comfort him and remove the leash, he pinned my hands to the carpet with his paws, clearly trying to prevent me from getting up.  It was a very puzzling encounter.

We've convinced him that his bed is a good place to be, but he'll lie down just about anywhere.  He's not too particular.  He generally sleeps through the night at the foot of our bed, but on three occasions he woke and started barking in the darkness.  Sometimes he craves attention; other times, he avoids us.  He sometimes gets exuberant, but he wimpers a lot, especially when Becky leaves the house.  Separation anxiety is certainly one of his challenges, but he wasn't destructive when we both left him during a 90 minute trial separation.  It will be interesting to see how he behaves after his hotspot heals and he's off his sedative.  

Loki has a lot to learn and much more to teach.

Project 2025: The Roadmap to a Unitary Executive

In April of 2023, The Heritage Foundation, along with a number of other conservative think tanks, published Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise, a compendium of policy recommendations for a the next conservative president.  It is popularly known as Project 2025. Commentators have suggested that Project 2025 is an attempt to avoid repeating the dysfunctional presidential transition of 2016, when Donald Trump unexpectedly won the White House.  At that time, no serious transition plans were in place.  This delayed any attempt by the new administration to affect public policy changes.  Conservatives saw it as a missed opportunity -- one they would not repeat.  I read much of Project 2025 on an 11 hour flight to Copenhagen.  I doubt I would have read so much of it were I not trapped on that flight, but what I read was quite revealing.   

Project 2025 is composed of 30 chapters detailing policy recommendations for a long list of executive departments and regulatory agencies.  Its authors include former Trump Administration staff members, advisors, and allies across a galaxy of conservative organizations.  Many of the recommendations call for the reinstatement of the Trump Administration's policies that were reversed by the Biden Administration.  Other recommendations call for policies the Trump Administration was unable to implement.  Some even go well-beyond what the Trump Administration envisioned.  In nearly every respect, it is undoubtedly an extraodinarily conservative manifesto.  Democrats have successfully exposed it for what it is.  Enough so that Trump and his campaign are insisting that it does not represent a blueprint for their agenda, but the extent to which the report advocates core Trump Administration policies reveals their disingenuousness.  

At the same time, the Trump campaign is establishing closer relations with another, less-prominent conservative policy shop: The America First Policy Institute (AFPI).  The Trump team has appointed the chair of the AFPI, Linda McMahon, to the Trump transition team.  I understand that the AFPI has authored its own policy report for a new conservative president.  Reporting suggests that the Heritage Foundation and the AFPI are on quite unfriendly terms.  Whether this means their policy prescriptions are significantly different or that they are simply separately ambitious policy advisors isn't clear to me, but the best evidence is that their recommendations are quiet similar, if not all but identical in the most important aspects.

Project 2025 is divided into five sections titled, (1) Taking the Reigns of Government, (2) The Common Defense, (3) The General Welfare, (4) The Economy, and (5) Independent Regulatory Agencies.  The first section is perhaps the most significant.  

In "Taking the Reigns of Government," Project 2025's authors believe that staff members hired in non-political, professional positions (career civil servants) have become entrenched in their offices and wield authority over policy that reflects only their own interests.  Consequently, career civil servants are thought to constitute an unelected fourth branch of government.  This is particularly worrying for the authors in that they believe career civil servants are overwhelmingly liberal and will not conscientiously implement the policies of a conservative president.   

Following the maxim, "personnel is policy," the authors recommend instituting rules that will allow the president to replace career civil servants in a host of departments and agencies with political appointees dedicated to the conservative president's policy agenda.  In the final months of his term in office, Trump signed an executive order (known as "Schedule F") which would reclassify many career civil servants and bring them under the direct control of the President.  Notably, Schedule F was the brainchild of James Sherk who later came to work for the AFPI.  Shortly after his election, Biden rescinded Trump's executive order.  

The authors of Project 2025 also propose the elimination or consolidation of a number of agencies and offices along with a drastic reduction in funding and staff in those that remain.  Together, these strategies are aimed at disempowering regulatory agencies by depriving them of resources and ensuring that they are staffed by people hostile to government regulation.  It is ironic that these proposals are described as an effort to de-politicize the civil service, as though promoting a conservative policy agenda under the direct control of a conservative president is apolitical.

Were the recommendations in "Taking the Reigns of Government" put in place, the power of the president would significantly increase.  The role of the president would become that of a "unitary executive," wielding more or less direct authority over every agency in the executive branch, regardless of the charge those agency received upon their creation by Congress.  In most instances, the work of regulatory agencies is to implement the will of Congress as expressed in necessarily vague legislation.  This often requires technical expertise that would be undermined by the political agenda of the sitting president's political appointees.  

According to Project 2025, presidential control over the executive branch should extend even to the Department of Justice which historically has maintained a degree of independence from the White House.  The loss of that independence would turn our justice system into a tool for political power and erode the basic rule of law.  In light of the recent Supreme Court ruling in Trump v. the United States which has made the president immune from prosecution when exercising "core powers" of the presidency, direct control over the Justice Department would be an extraordinary expansion of presidential power.  It would provide presidents with a legal sword to complement their recently acquired legal shield and would create extraordinary powers no president has ever had.

The main thrust of "Taking the Reigns of Government" is the expansion and consolidation of power in the hands of the president.  Given the weakness of Congress over the last sixty years, it's hard to argue that the balance of power would be improved by a stronger executive.  Of course, the authors of Project 2025 argue that their prescriptions have less to do with division of power between branches of government and more to do with the un-elected fourth branch of government: "the deep state;" but in light of the rise of authoritarian movements in the U.S. and in Europe, a stronger executive is precisely the tool that these movements would use to undermine our democratic traditions.  

The latter four sections of Project 2025 drill down to offer specific proposals for the restructure and even the elimination of Cabinet departments and agencies.  Furthermore, they go beyond making structural recommendations to propose specific public policies commonly advocated by the extreme rightwing of our body politic.  

Much of the content here is deep, deep, deep in the weeds of government and would require highly specialized, professional expertise to assess its consequences, but some things do stand out even for lay readers.  My own interest in the climate crisis prompted me to read the chapters on the Department of Energy, the Department of the Interior, and the Environmental Protection Agency.  It is clear that the main thrust of these chapters is to promote the production of fossil fuel energy in whatever way possible.  Lip service is given to alternative energy sources, but Project 2025 comes just barely shy of baldly asserting the slogan "drill, baby, drill."  Primary goals are to expand the production and export of liquid natural gas (liquid methane), to open up additional federal lands for oil and gas exploration, and to weaken regulations protecting against environmental harms from fossil fuel production and the extraction industries. 

The last of these goals deserves special attention.  Project 2025 envisions a significantly reduced role for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  The EPA would, at most, become a junior partner to state environmental protection offices.  By giving state environmental offices the primary decision making authority in regulatory environmental matters, the fossil fuel industry and other extraction industries would be in a strong position to ensure that specific states would accommodate their interests.  

Weakening the EPA in this manner dovetails with two recent Supreme Court rulings.  In 2023, the Court ruled in Ohio v. EPA to block an air emission requirement known as "the Good Neighbor Rule," which protects downwind states from pollutants originating from upwind states.  Later, in 2024, the Supreme Court ruled in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo to sharply reduce the authority of regulatory agencies under the "Chevron deference" doctrine, named after the landmark court case Chevron v. NRDC.  Chevron deference recognized the expertise of regulatory agencies in interpreting legislation.  Loper gutted deference to the agencies and elevated the standing of industry plaintiffs.  Consequently, decision making that often requires highly technical expertise now lies in the hands of judges who often are not equipped to adjudicate the facts.  

Between blocking the Good Neighbor Rule and enfeebling the Chevron deference, the Court has significantly weakened the EPA.  It would be a final, fatal blow to environmental protection were a unitary executive to make the EPA a junior partner to state environmental offices.  Opponents of the EPA have long sought these policies.  Some have even suggested eliminating the EPA out right.  In 2017, freshman Congressmember Matt Gaetz introduced a bill to do just that.  Indeed, the extent to which Project 2025 intends to limit the authority of the EPA, along with proposed significant budget and personnel cuts, amounts to the Agency's near elimination.

Despite his denials, a future Trump administration is likely to adopt, at very least, the main thrust Project 2025.  Much of Project 2025 is critical of diversity, equity, and inclusion efforts in the executive branch.  It calls for eliminating the Department of Education, reversing FDA approval of mifepristone used in medical abortions, prohibiting the mail delivery of abortion medication, equipment, and other materials, ending birthright citizenship, deporting millions of immigrants, and numerous other extreme policies.  Trump can be expected to follow through on those plans. 

In a recent speech in Wisconsin, Trump expressly proposed reforms that would bring the Department of Justice under the direct control of the President and firing civil servants charged with carrying out policies he disagrees with.  Trump also announce that he would appoint Elon Musk to head a new government efficiency commission "tasked with conducting a complete financial and performance audit of the entire federal government and making recommendations for drastic reforms."  He went on to criticize federal agencies of committing fraud and making costly improper payments.  His criticism of waste in government (without identifying specific examples) are consistent with Project 2025's justification for merging separate executive office, reducing their funding and staffs, and in many cases eliminating offices entirely.  

While the aims of Project 2025 are consistent with -- even identical to -- Trump's aims, the document should not be read simply as Donald Trump's platform.  The Heritage Foundation and the galaxy of conservative think tanks and academics who authored Project 2025 have given us the clearest picture of the rightwing agenda in American politics.  Furthermore, the close alignment of Trump's policies with Project 2025 and his embrace of the AFPI, suggest that America's rightwing is broadly unified around this agenda.  It would behoove political analysts to dig deep into the weeds in Project 2025 to understand the political terrain of the decade ahead, regardless of the results of November's election. 

Democracy, Plutocracy, and Oligarchy

Democrats have been sounding the alarm that Donald Trump and the movement behind him poses a threat to democracy.  The concern is real, of course, but we should note that it threatens an already flawed democracy -- a democracy more accurately called a "plutocracy."  Our plutocracy is a result of public elections being funded through virtually unlimited private contributions.  Unlike our school districts, our police departments, our fire departments, and other public sector institutions, our electoral system lies squarely in the private sector and is subject to all the inequities in that sector.

The intrusion of vast sums of private money into our elections privileges the wealthiest individuals among us.  When campaigns rely on private funding, a candidate must gain the support of those people in control of significant wealth to run an effective campaign.  Candidates who cannot, simply can't compete.  Privately funded electoral systems undermine ostensibly equal political liberties in which each person's political preferences weigh equally.  They inevitably produces a plutocracy:  a system in which the wealthy political donor class collectively guarantees the viability of candidates that protect their class interests.  In a plutocracy, a person's potential political power is equal to their wealth.  This is bad enough, but recently, our plutocracy has begun devolving into an even more undemocratic system:  an oligarchy:  a system in which not a broad, wealthy social class, but super-wealthy individuals exercise extreme influence on political campaigns.  

According to OpenSecrets, up through the 2010 election cycle, no individual or couple made contributions to federal elections of more than $20 million in a single election cycle; however, as a result of the 2010 ruling in Citizens United, the American oligarchy got underway.  In the 2012 election cycle, Sheldon and Miriam Adelson made political contributions amounting to $93.1 million, Harold and Annette Simmons contributed more than $27 million, and Bob and Doylene Perry contributed $24.5 million -- all to Republican candidates or Republican causes.  Democratic oligarchs responded in the following election cycle.  Tom Steyer contributed $75.4 million and Michael Bloomberg contributed $28.5 million -- all to Democratic candidates and Democratic causes.  After that, well, Katie bar the door.

The U.S. private system of campaign finance has given super-wealthy individuals the power to affect elections that no ordinary citizen has ever had.  Since Citizens United, 33 individuals or couples contributed more than $20 million to candidates and political causes in a single election cycle.  In the 2020 cycle, 15 individuals or couples contributed a combined total of $912 million.  In the 2022 cycle, 19 individuals or couples contributed $861.9 million.  Based on data released by the Federal Elections Commission on Feb. 2, 2024, in the 2024 cycle, 12 individuals or couples had already contributed $542.2 million.  Since Citizens United, people donating $20 million or more in a single cycle have contributed over $3.3 billion to candidates and political causes.

The partisan breakdown of donations is also revealing.  After Citizens United, Republican donors contributed over $1.95 billion.  Democratic donors contributed $1.42 billion.  One might conclude from this that while the Republicans have an edge, the rough equality of these numbers means that our system is not especially skewed against either political party; but that overlooks the bias against candidates who aren't popular among wealthy donors.  There can be vigorous disagreement between Republicans and Democrats regarding many issues, but there will never be serious threats to the wealth of oligarchs or the system that created it.  According to the Pew Research Center, roughly a third of Americans have a favorable view of socialism.  It's unlikely that a third of our oligarchs have a similarly favorable view.  

Only a few politicians will succeed by taking positions that are critical of the private interests that fund our elections.  Sen. Bernie Sanders and Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez are notable here.  Their success, however, is due to the size and demographics of their constituencies.  Ocasio-Cortez represents a single, urban congressional district, populated by an electorate that is unlike the wider U.S. population.  As such, she is more able to defeat the influence of big money.  The same is true for Sanders.  After all, Vermont's population is no larger than a single congressional district.  Consequently, Sanders is able overcome the interference of outside, big money; but the general political economy of campaign finance ensures that Ocasio-Cortez and Sanders will be rare exceptions. 

Opensecrets.org has done a good job of examining campaign finance records to identify the most prominent oligarchs.  To make the short list, I have set a bar of contributions of at least $20 million in a single election cycle going back to 2010 -- the earliest data published by OpenSecrets.   Here are the 33 campaign finance oligarchs that make the cut and their total individual contributions since Citizens United:

1. Sheldon & Miriam Adelson (Rep.)  $542,711,025 
2. Michael Bloomberg (Dem.)  $350,224,779
3. Tom & Kathryn Steyer (Dem.)  $312,394,765
4. Richard & Elizabeth Uihlein (Rep.)  $293,341,633
5. George Soros (Dem.)  $221,066,069
6. Timothy Mellon (Rep.)  $216,884,270
7. Kenneth Griffin (Rep.)  $215,446,668
8. Jeffrey & Janine Yass (Rep.) $157,449,281
9. Fred Eychaner (Dem.) $97,154,090
10. James & Marilyn Simons (Dem.)  $97,067,551
11. Donald Sussman (Dem.)  $95,845,250
12. Paul Singer (Dem.) $87,383,278
13. Dustin & Cari Moskovitz (Rep.) $77,569,612
14. Stephen & Christine Schwarzman (Rep.) $72,857,142
15. Karla Jurvetson (Dem.) $58,905,366
16. Laura Perlmutter (Rep.)  $44,461,791
17. Sam Bankman-Fried (Dem.) $40,743,790
18. Peter Thiel (Rep.) $35,373,342
19. Lawrence Ellison (Rep.) $31,007,943
20. Rob Bigelow (Rep.) $29,641,500
21. Shirley Ryan (Rep.)  $28,206,300
22. Harold & Annette Simmons (Rep.)  $27,066,900
23. Diane Hendricks (Rep.)  $25,742,500
24. Reid Garrett Hoffman (Dem.)  $25,701,401
25. Robert & Diane Mercer (Rep.)  $25,620,300
26. Bernard & Billi Wilma Marcs (Rep.)  $24,736,435
27. Felicia Horowitz (Both)  $24,529,147
28. Bob & Doylene Perry (Rep.)  $24,509,200
29. Marc Andreessen (Both)  $24,452,665
30. Ryan Salame (Rep.)  $24,053,000
31. James & Mary Pritzker (Dem.)  $22,305,000
32. John & Marlene Ricketts (Rep.)  $21,555,750
33. Deborah Simon (Dem.)  $20,006,173

As mentioned before, the total amount donated by these 33 oligarchs exceeds $3.3 billion, but these totals do not include the vast amount of money that the oligarchs might well be channeling through "dark money" committees that are not required to disclose their donors.  Nor do these totals include donations to state and local elections; so, for example, the $323.6 million J.B. Pritzker spent of his own money on his two campaigns for governor of Illinois are not included.

One way to support democracy and mitigate the power of oligarchs is to remove political campaign funding from the private sphere and establish a workable system of publicly financed elections.  The best method I know of for doing this was suggested by Lawrence Lessig in his 2011 book, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress and How to Stop It.  See my review of it at books, etc.

Briefly, Lessig proposes that each voter be granted a $50 voucher they can use to contribute to any candidate or candidates they choose.  Additionally, any voter may contribute an additional $100 of their own money as long as they make no other, political donations.  This would ensure that candidates that are genuinely popular are able to run effective campaigns.  Assuming every registered voter made use of their voucher, it would cost the Treasury about $8.4 billion which is about 58% of the total expenditures for all federal elections in 2020.  Under this system, elections would be funded by voters, not oligarchs.

      

Law and Disorder

Donald Trump was convicted of Class E felony charges related to the falsification of business records with the intent to cover up other unlawful actions. This has put a spotlight on our judicial system and has raised a concern among many pro-Trump Americans that the judicial system has become corrupted by political ambitions.  It adds to their concern that the FBI and the Department of Justice have become tools to persecute Donald Trump and that the 2020 election was stolen.  Many pro-Trump Americans believe that our democracy is on the ropes.  

Ironically, Americans who oppose Donald Trump agree that our democracy is on the ropes, but for quite different reasons.  They point to concerns ranging from attacks on our electoral processes, disinformation spread by both traditional and social media, and violations of the law by Trump and his supporters during the January 6th assault on Congress.  Anti-Trumpers are especially concerned about the use of mob violence and intimidation by Trump supporters to achieve political goals. 

One does not have to take sides on which of these critiques is valid to recognize that our democracy is genuinely under stress.  The very fact that the two dominant political parties in the country each are squaring off to defend American democracy is a prescription for disaster.  When so much is at stake, scruples might seem like a luxury.  Consequently, it's worth looking carefully at what democracy is and asking what currently are the most significant genuine threats to it.  

Three features characterize a (liberal) democracy:  (1) free and fair elections, (2) protections for basic civil rights, and (3) the rule of law.  Societies in which these characteristics are comparatively robust can be described as democratic.  These features distinguish democracy from other forms of political authority, e.g., aristocracy, theocracy, ethnocracy, plutocracy, and oligarchy.

Free and fair elections help to ensure that governing authorities will exercise power with the consent of the people or at least with the consent of most of the people.  With a mandate from the majority, we can expect officials will implement public policies that are in accord with the will of the majority.  This, of course, will not always be true, but free and fair elections are our best avenue toward the implementation of popular public policies.  

Granting unlimited, sovereign power to the majority is not, however, an unambiguous good.  As modern liberal democracies came into being centuries ago, many people expressed concern that the majority might pursue its favored public policies at the unjustified expense of the minority.  Such a circumstance was labeled, "the tyranny of the majority."  To guard against this, democratic societies established lists of civil rights which were to be protected against the majority will.  The U.S. Bill of Rights and the French Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen are two such lists.  These new democratic states were founded on both the will of the majority and the rights of individuals and minorities, thus creating an unavoidable tension.  Where the authority of the majority ends and the rights of the individual and minorities begin will always be contested.

Finally, the rule of law is foundational not only to democracy, but to any well-ordered society.  It is nearly axiomatic that in a liberal democracy, no one is "above the law."  Each person must be subject to the law equally.  Their rights as individuals or as members of minorities must not be abridged, and their right to participate in the selection of government officials must be guaranteed equally.  

However, non-democratic forms of government also can operate under the rule of law, just a different rule of law.  In non-democratic societies, laws might be established solely by members of a certain political party or elite, unelected religious leaders, members of a specific ethnic group, the wealthiest class of citizens, a few extremely wealthy individuals, or even by a single totalitarian ruler.  In each of these societies, the will of the majority and/or the rights of individuals are not fully respected.  So if we prize liberal democracy, we must defend a rule of law that is consistent with liberal democracy, not just any rule of law.  

Beyond protecting the will of the majority and basic civil rights, valid democratic laws are the product of institutions that are characteristic of a democratic order.  Imagine a society ruled by a benign dictator who just so happens to enact popular policies and protects basic civil rights.  While this might be superficially satisfactory, such a society is not democratic.  Its benefits are contingent upon the will of the dictator.  In contrast, a society governed by institutions designed to protect the power of the majority to enact public policy and to protect basic civil rights provides a more stable guarantee of democratic legitimacy.  Laws and judicial decisions that are a product of such institutions enjoy the presumption of validity, and the authorities acting within those institutions have a prima facia claim to legitimacy.    

Returning, then, to the concerns of both pro-Trump and anti-Trump Americans, which group has a better claim to understanding the real threat to democracy?  The answer seems clear.  Pro-Trump Americans assert that the institutions of democracy have become corrupted.  They claim that mail-in balloting which was expanded during the covid pandemic allowed voter fraud to undermine our elections.  Additionally, or perhaps as a result, they claim that millions of ineligible voters cast ballots in our past two presidential elections.  They say at very least, enough voter fraud occurred to defeat Donald Trump and elect Joe Biden.  Furthermore, they claim that a Democratic "deep state" intent on prosecuting Donald Trump and his allies have "weaponized" the Justice Department and the FBI, including state and federal prosecutors and judges.  

The complaints made by pro-Trump Americans are aimed at both the electoral system and judicial protections of civil rights.  Pro-Trumpers have, however, provided little to no evidence that significant changes to our institutions have taken place beyond Biden's victory and the indictments and convictions of Trump and his allies.  The results of an election and/or the prosecution of any individual or individuals alone provide no reason to believe either that our institutions have or have not been corrupted.  Without evidence, these attacks on our institutions themselves constitute a threat to democracy.

Our electoral system has been in operation for more than two hundred years.  It has, over time, been reformed again and again by competing interests to help ensure that it accurately counts our votes.  Elaborate mechanisms monitored by everyone involved in the electoral process help ensure its integrity.  This gives our electoral system a strong prima facia claim to accuracy.  To date, every examination of the electoral processes in 2020 (and 2016) have uncovered no reason to doubt its accuracy. 

Pro-Trump criticism of our judicial processes also fall flat, even if they contain a kernel of truth.  Disdain for Trump by Democratic prosecutors might well be a motivating factor in bringing charges against him and his allies, but just as with our electoral system, our judicial system has been shaped and reshaped over more than two hundred years in an effort to reach fair and accurate judgments.  Most importantly, it includes trials by juries.  The determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant is entirely separate from the motives of the prosecutor.  In the case of criminal charges, the prosecutor must convince each of 12 jurors -- selected with the input of the defendant -- that there is no reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.  Any prosecutor motivated by political goals will need to demonstrate their case within these established procedures.  Trump's prosecutors have done just that.  It is noteworthy that at the time of this writing, 42 jurors have found Trump guilty of charges against him with none dissenting.

What differentiates pro-Trump and anti-Trump concerns about our democracy is their relationships to our institutions.  Pro-Trump criticisms rely on the claim that our institutions have become corrupted.  Anti-Trumper reply that those complaints about our institutions are unjustified.  Until pro-Trumpers can offer evidence to support their views, it is reasonable to assume our institutions have not meaningfully changed over the course of the last eight years.  Whatever legitimacy they afforded the election of past presidents, they afford Joe Biden.  And whatever legitimacy they afford the countless judicial decisions made daily, they afford decisions in the Trump trials.

The concern about the fragility of our democracy among anti-Trumpers stems not from the state of our institutions, but from the direct attacks on them.  Those threats are undeniable.  Trump repeatedly has voiced unsupported attacks on our political and judicial institutions and encouraged political violence.  He, furthermore, has made statements threatening to transform our institutions by putting in place procedures that undermine their democratic nature.  Tellingly, many of his supporters openly advocate disregard for the law in a misguided effort to defend democracy.  They appear to be willing to push our political system toward what they might see as a temporary, benevolent dictatorship, but a dictatorship nonetheless.  They seem unconcerned that their actions would in fact deny the will of the majority, shred protections for civil rights, and undermine the rule of democratic law without guaranteeing an avenue back to democracy.  

We should recognize, however, that actual societies are never purely democratic or non-democratic.  They can only be characterized more or less so.  Forms of authority are not like tree species.  Maple trees are different from oak trees which are different from pine trees, etc.  For all common purposes, any individual tree can be categorized as squarely within one or another species of tree.  In contrast, categorizing a political order as democratic, plutocratic, ethnocratic, oligarchic, etc. admits of degrees.  All states are a mixture of at least some of these forms.  At best, we can compare existing political orders to each other and describe one as, say, more democratic than another.

So just as there are non-democratic features to our current political and judicial institutions, e.g., privately financed political campaigns and unequal access to a capable legal defense, there will remain democratic features to any political order instituted by a second Trump administration.  In the event Trump is again elected president, we must make the most of these democratic features to limit what damage he does.

The Political Geography of Chance

What are Joe Biden's and Donald Trump's chances to win the 2024 election?  The answers depend on their ability to win in seven "swing states" that collectively account for 93 electoral votes:  Pennsylvania (19 votes), North Carolina (16 votes), Georgia (16 votes), Michigan (15 votes), Arizona (11 votes), Wisconsin (10 votes), and Nevada (6 votes).  Setting these states aside, Biden can expect 226 votes and Trump can expect 219 votes from the “safe states.”  

The results in each of the swing states in 2020 were extremely close.  Each was decided by less than 3% of the vote, giving both candidates a realistic chance of winning any of them this year.  What follows is an a priori assessment of the candidates' chances based on two assumptions:  (1) outcomes are in doubt in only the seven swing states listed above and (2) Biden and Trump have an equal chance of winning any of them. 

With seven swing states, there are 128 possible scenarios that could produce the final Electoral College totals. These range from Biden winning all seven to Trump winning all seven and any win-loss combination between.  Among these scenarios, Biden wins in 71 and Trump wins in 57.  This gives Biden a 55% (71/128) chance of winning and Trump a 44.5% (57/128) chance.

The "coin flip" assumption I am making, giving each candidate an equal chance of winning in any particular swing state, is important.  Most prognosticators look beyond the mere logical possibilities and speculate as to why one candidate or another has a greater or lesser chance of winning in a swing state.  They look at polling results, economic conditions, concurrent ballot initiatives, campaign spending, and other factors to handicap the race.  That is, they look for reasons to reject the coin flip assumption.

This is a perfectly good enterprise, but with more than seven months until Election Day, it's hard to know how political conditions will unfold in any particular swing state.  Furthermore, any argument I have seen for or against Biden or Trump comes with noteworthy caveats.  Right now, a coin flip doesn't seem to be a bad estimate of the chances in any particular swing state.  

In any case, the coin flip assumption provides a baseline upon which we can do additional analyses.  For example, we can see how a candidate's chance of winning it all changes when we assume a victory in any one of the seven swing states.  Recall, considering only safe states, Biden's chance of winning is 55.5% and Trump's is 44.5%.  If we assume a candidate wins one swing state, the possible scenarios are reduced to 64, and his chance of winning it all increases as follows.

If Biden wins PA, his chance increases to 79.5% (51/64).
If Biden wins NC, GA, or MI, his chance increases to 72% (46/64).
If Biden wins AZ or WI, his chance increases to 65.5% (42/64).
If Biden wins NV, his chance increases to 61% (39/64).

If Trump wins PA, his chance increases to 69% (44/64).
If Trump wins NC, GA, or MI, his chance increases to 61% (39/64).
If Trump wins AZ or WI, his chance increases to 54.5% (35/64).
If Trump wins NV, his chance increases to 50% (32/64).

We can do a similar calculation assuming a candidate wins not just one swing state, but two.  Assuming a candidate wins two states, the possible scenarios are reduced to 32.  Since PA is the biggest prize, we’ll assume it is one of those two states.

If Biden wins PA and NC, GA, or MI, his chance increases to 94% (30/32).
If Biden wins PA and AZ or WI, his chance increases to 90.5% (29/32).
If Biden wins PA and NV, his chance increases to 81% (26/32).

If Trump wins PA and NC, GA, or MI, his chance increases to 87.5% (28/32).
If Trump wins PA and AZ, WI, or NV, his chance increases to 78% (25/32).

Some of the 128 possible scenarios result in very close electoral outcomes.  There are four in which a change in just one electoral vote alters the outcome.  This would bring the results in Maine and Nebraska into the calculation, because Maine and Nebraska allot some of their electors by congressional district.  

Maine Congressional District 1 and Nebraska Congressional District 2 could possibly become meaningful.  Neither district is within the 3% threshold I am using to identify swing states, but I suspect congressional districts are more volatile than whole states; so these two districts might well vote differently in 2024 than they did in 2020.  Biden lost ME-1 in 2020.  If he wins it this time, he'll win in three more scenarios among the 128.  Trump lost NE-2 in 2020.  If he wins it this time, he'll win in one more scenario.  If both districts flip this year, then they will have no combined effect on the outcome.  This suggests that the Maine and Nebraska districts have only a very small chance of coming into play, but never say never.

One final comment:  Biden and Trump normally need to win at least four swing states to win it all, but there are some scenarios  in which they will prevail by winning just three swing states:  Biden wins it all by winning PA and any one of NC, GA, MI, plus one of the remaining five big electoral vote states ( (NC, GA, MI, AZ, or WI).  He also prevails if he wins NC, GA, and MI (without PA).  This gives him 11 3-state paths to victory.  In contrast, Trump has only three 3-state paths to victory which are by winning PA and two of NC, GA, or MI.  

So the math is pretty clear:  PA is uniquely critical to the outcome of the race.  

The results in PA have been razor thin whenever Trump has been on the ballot.  In 2016, Trump won PA by 0.724% (44,292 votes).  In 2020, Biden won PA by 1.165% (80,555 votes).  Of course, much has happened since the Election Day 2020, but as we have a rematch of the same, very well-known and polarizing candidates, PA is likely to be both close and decisive.  If we want to look beyond the a priori coin flip possibilities and examine substantive reasons why one of the candidates might win it all, looking at Pennsylvania is the best place to start.